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I
One of the greatest and most fundamental problems all religions are now con­
fronted with is their relation to science. The world-view prevalent in science, 
the scientific way of thinking in general, shows itself as absolutely incompatible 
with the world-view or ontology which the traditional religions have, by and 
large, regarded as their basis. The objection might here be raised, that such a 
world-view or ontology is a so-called metaphysics or philosophy, but is not a 
religion, nor has anything to do with the essential life of religion. An objection 
of this sort has a half-truth, to be sure. But it cannot be said to be the whole 
truth.
When a religion comes into being concretely, that is, as a historical fact, it 
always has as its basis a world-view or ontology of one sort or another, even 
though it may be in a form in which it is not yet fully conscious of itself. For 
a religion, such a “philosophy” is not like clothes that one can change when­
ever he pleases. It is to religion just what water is to fish. It is the indispens­
able condition by virtue of which religion can actually come into existence. 
Water is neither the life of the fish as such nor its body, yet it is fundamentally 
linked with them. A change of the world-view or ontology is a matter no less 
fatal to religion than a change of salt water to fresh is to a fish.
Hence, the view that religion and science never come into conflict with each 
other if they remain confined within their proper limits, because each has its 
own proper realm and task, is not adequate for the purpose of solving the 
problem. A limit between two realms, a borderline, separates them from 
each other. But at the same time, it belongs to both of them. The crux of the
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problem we are now confronted with lies precisely in this borderline. In fact, 
it can be said that metaphysics and philosophy have been since ancient times 
a research of this borderline between science and religion. No neutral zone can 
exist between them, standing detached from them.
Moreover, it has now come to pass that the question has become one of 
whether a borderline, in fact, exists. For at present, science does not feel it 
necessary to take up the question of its own limits. In other words, the stand­
point of science perhaps essentially has a tendency to overlook religion as well 
as philosophy—except perhaps the “scientific” philosophy which translates 
without ado the philosophical standpoint into the scientific one. This amounts 
to saying that science appears as something which regards as its own a stand­
point of unquestionable truth, that can assert itself over all. Hence, again, the 
character of absoluteness that always accompanies scientific knowledge.
For this reason, we can now no longer content ourselves with setting 
respective limits to science and religion, as we have become accustomed to do. 
The problem is more critical than the so-called theology of crisis thought it 
to be.
We can say that the reason science is able to conceive its own standpoint as 
that of unquestionable truth lies in the pure objectivity of the laws of nature, 
which are the presupposition and the content of scientific knowledge. No 
one is allowed to interfere with a scientific explanation of the laws of nature 
except scientifically. Science always requires that the criticism and correction 
of this explanation should be made only from its own standpoint. Because of 
this, although a scientific explanation has, properly speaking, a hypothetical 
character, its contents are, nevertheless, each time presented as objective facts. 
In the fact that science renders this possible is found the power unique to 
science, the authority inherent in science.
If this is true, does it follow that the contents of religion, philosophy, and 
art, if compared with the absolute character of scientifically objective know­
ledge, are nothing but mere productions of subjective conception or imagina­
tion? Is the scientific truth the whole truth due to its absoluteness? Or, is it 
not possible to think that, besides the absoluteness of scientific truth, in other 
realms truths would also exist, which are absolute in their respective spheres?
At first glance, it seems not possible that a variety of absolute truth obtains. 
The general opinion is that “two absolute truths” is a contradiction in terms 
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and that only one or the other can be true. But is this opinion after all self- 
evident? Is it not rather based upon a certain fixed and merely particular 
idea of the absolute or of the relative? Is the possibility of some new way 
of thinking about the absolute and the relative according to which two ab­
solutes obtain entirely out of question? In attempting to think about the 
relative, is there no other alternative for us but to set a limit in the manner 
of dividing a sheet of paper by drawing a line across it? Would it not be in­
correct for us to put aside the possibility of an entirely new mode of thinking 
about the absolute and the relative, according to which, as with a single sheet 
of paper seen from both front and back, two things, in spite of, or rather by 
reason of, their both being absolute, turn out to be all the more relative?
In order to account for these problems, I would like to approach the question 
of the relationship between science and philosophy from a little different angle 
than that hitherto ordinarily employed.
If the aforementioned objectivity of the laws of nature is taken for granted, 
the first question to be here posed is: in what horizon or on what level are the 
laws encountered and accepted? For instance, when a dog jumps at a piece of 
bread thrown by a man and catches it in the air, such “beings” as a piece of 
bread, a man, a dog, as well as their respective movements, are all subject to 
physico-chemical laws. Seen from this point of view, these “beings” and their 
respective movements, deprived of their particular concreteness, will be re­
duced to the homogeneous relationship of atoms and particles. It is in this 
relationship and the various laws holding sway over it that the true and real 
aspect of the concrete things and their movements I have just spoken of is 
thought to consist.
Of course, on top of the physico-chemical realm, are supposed to exist the 
biological, the psychological, and eventually the realm of “spirit” or “per­
sonality.” But various phenomena in these realms will all be regarded as 
capable of reduction in one way or another to the physico-chemical relations 
or laws and capable of being explained from them.
However, looking at it from another angle, it is undeniable that such 
“beings” as a piece of bread, a dog, and a human being exist each with its 
proper mode of being and with its proper “eidos” What is more, these “be­
ings” make together a particular connection: for the dog, for example, the piece
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of bread and the man are in its “environment”; the same can be said with the 
man in his relationship to the piece of bread and the dog. The respective 
properties, manners of movement, and bodily structures inherent in the 
human being and the dog cannot be comprehended apart from the special 
characteristic of the environment each of them possesses.
Moreover, in this relation of “beings” to their environments, the way 
whereby the laws of nature are “accepted” varies according to the different 
levels on which they are accepted. As for the case I have just mentioned, the 
dog and the human being live, so to speak, the laws of nature in their re­
spective behaviors. Here, the laws of nature are the laws which are lived. 
They appear in all living “beings” as the laws which are lived in their re­
spective lives.
Moreover, when, in the case of a dog and a human being, the laws are lived 
in their respective lives—for instance, in the behaviors of man’s throwing a 
piece of bread and of the dog’s jumping at it—these behaviors involve at the 
same time a sort of bodily realization of the laws of nature; an understanding 
which is generally denoted by the vague term “instinct,” or, to put it inversely, 
an understanding anterior to the understanding proper.
We cannot here embark upon detailed consideration of the “instinct” 
Bergson and other thinkers pursued very deeply. All that we can say is that 
“instinct” is based, on the one hand, on a particular relation of individuals and 
their environments—this relation is particular, because it determines the pro­
perties, movements, bodily structures, and so forth of living beings—and on 
the other, upon the “specific” mode of being which is inherited as the “eidos” 
of individuals from the parent individual to the child individual. “Instinct” 
can rather be said to come into play at the dynamic intersection of these two 
directions. Of course, such a general argument regarding instinct is not ade­
quate even for making a basic distinction between plants and animals. But, 
for the time being, I will set aside further discussion of this problem.
From the standpoint of natural science, the laws of nature must be “at work” 
as dominant forces also in the afore-mentioned behaviors of living beings. But 
the point here is that these dominant laws reveal themselves in living beings 
as the laws lived and acted out with a sort of “instinctive” bodily realization. 
Here, the laws of nature reveal themselves only when living beings live and act 
them and thus embody and bodily understand them. In the world of concrete 
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“being,” the laws manifest their dominance only when the beings actualize 
them. This means that the domination of the laws is, in the case of living 
beings, encountered on the instinct level. Or, it can be said that the very way 
whereby the laws are encountered in living beings, the way through which 
the laws are established in the afore-mentioned fashion, that is, the fact itself 
that the laws become the laws which are lived and acted, is none other than 
what is termed “instinct.” Instinctive behaviors are the actualization of the 
laws of nature. That living beings’ acts occur only in accordance with these 
laws means that the laws are “at work,” so to speak, in and as these acts. The 
rational law of being (ratio essendfy on the level of living “beings,” comes into 
its own reality as the law which is embodied and bodily realized.
Generally speaking, such a way of actualization of the rational law has a 
“purposive” (teleological) character. The field wherein living beings arise and 
instinct comes into play is the field wherein the rational law of being acquires 
a teleological character. Here, physico-chemical laws are brought into syn­
thesis in a purposive construction, supplying the material for this construction.
Let us look now at man. What characterizes man is technique. In his com­
prehension of the relation between a definite purpose aimed at and definite 
means required for its actualization is involved a knowledge of the laws of 
nature.
In contrast with mere instinct, technique involves some sort of intellectual 
comprehension of these laws. When primitive men made an instrument and 
learned how to make fire by its use, this understanding may be said to have 
implied the knowledge, even if in an embryonic form, of the laws of nature 
as laws. To use instruments and act technically comes about only through the 
knowledge thus implied.
To put it the other way round, knowledge advances only through man 
acting technically, and the advancement of knowledge, in its turn, develops 
technique. Here the laws become the known laws; the laws which, while being 
known, are lived and acted in instrumental techniques.
In this case, too, man’s working in accordance with the laws of nature in techni­
cal actions means that the laws are “at work” in and as his working, and that, 
in this way, they become manifest and come to be realized as laws.
The only thing in this case that differs from the case of instinct is that the 
laws are actualized into actions through being reflected upon knowledge.
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And that knowing actualization is nothing else than the technique. Here, the 
laws appear and come into their own reality on the field wherein knowl­
edge advances parallel to action. The dominance of the laws is accepted and 
encountered on such a field.
The same can be said of the case in which knowledge becomes scientific and 
technique also becomes scientific in its train. In the natural sciences, laws are 
known purely as laws in their abstractedness and universality. Technique also 
becomes mechanical, which implies such a knowledge of the laws. In this case 
also, the development of technique advances the apparatus of observation and 
experiment so that it gives impetus to the progress of scientific knowledge. 
And the progress of knowledge, in its turn, promotes the development of 
technique. Since the mechanization of technique the tempo of this reciprocal 
development of knowledge and technique has accelerated rapidly.
The meaning of man’s always acting in accordance with the laws of nature 
is disclosed most thoroughly in mechnical technique. At the same time, that 
the laws of nature are actualized in and as man’s actions reveals its meaning 
most radically in the same mechanical technique. It is in precisely this area 
of mechanical technique, wherein knowledge and purposive action go their 
way to a further development in ever-increasing reciprocal acceleration, that 
the laws of nature come to appear in their character as law. The laws are en­
countered most intimately in this area. Mechanical technique and machines 
are the ultimate embodiment and bodily understanding in man of the laws 
of nature.
In this way, the laws of nature appear and come into their own reality on 
various levels and various fields, and we encounter them on all these levels. 
We encounter them no less on the field of instinct, where we are on the same 
level as a dog, and on that of material inertia where we are on a par with a piece 
of bread, than on that of technical activity where we make use of instruments 
and machines.
Besides, it has generally been held that the developments of distinctions of 
these various levels sums up concisely the history of human “progress.” 
In other words, the tendency in which, with insistent rationalization of man’s 
knowledge of nature through science and technology, his intellect itself and 




Now, in the context of what I have just spoken of, we find two things being 
united into one. One is that the laws of nature hold sway over all things, 
ranging from inanimate things to human beings, according to different modes 
of being on their respective levels. We can here recognize that the dominating 
power of laws over beings has come to extend its domain by permeating the 
various levels of things. While inanimate things are merely made up of matter, 
living beings are composed of matter and, at the same time, provided with 
life, and human beings are endowed with intellect in addition to their being 
composed of matter and provided with life. That the laws of nature rule, to the 
very end, throughout the various levels which unfold themselves one after 
another within the domain of beingness reveals a gradual increase of the rule 
of laws over the things.
The rational law of being exhibits a perspective with multiple levels. Its 
“teleological” (purposive) character ascends accordingly as the level of being 
is elevated and eventually comes to its complete realization in the machine, 
in which man’s purposive actions are put in motion in a purely “mechan­
ical” manner. There is here, we can say, the rule of the laws of nature carried 
to its extremity.
Now, the other thing to be noticed here is that, in proportion to such an 
ascent of the ruling power of the laws, there appears a gradual penetration of 
the power of beings over the laws as they use them. This second aspect shows 
that the release of “beings” from the laws of nature through their use of them, 
their emancipation from the bondage of laws, and hence their freedom, is 
manifested in beings more and more deeply.
It is a matter of course that these two aspects connect into one. The higher 
the level of being ascends, the deeper the rule of laws reaches out into being­
ness. But, at the same time, the freedom of beings in using them comes to 
be realized all the more.
As for inanimate things, since they are wholly passive toward the rule of 
laws, the rule is to that extent direct, but to the same extent shallow and 
superficial. In the instinctive behaviors of living things, however, the laws 
appear as laws which are lived and acted. This signifies that the rule of laws 
here makes its appearance in a more intimately intensified and internalized 
form than in inanimate things. Even the life and behavior of living things 
cannot stray a step from the laws of nature. On the other side, however, in 
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that they live them they already take a step forward in the direction of the 
riddance of laws.
In short, already in their mode of being (as “living” beings) we can get a 
glimpse, however vague, of the fact that subordination to the laws is at 
once emancipation from their bondage. In the “instinctive” life and be­
havior, the actualization of the laws of nature and the use which is made 
of them are directly united. It is only to be noted here that, insofar as this 
connection is direct, the world of living things is still tied down to the laws.
When man acts technically with instruments, however, the rule of nature’s 
laws comes to light in a still more internalized form, and at the same time, 
the fact that the laws are made use of manifests itself all the more lucidly. This 
is because the laws come to realize themselves in man’s actions through 
intellect. It is only in man’s actions that we are able clearly to recognize that 
the subordination to laws means at once freedom from their bondage. And the 
most radical manifestation of this relation can be seen on the level wherein 
technique becomes mechanized.
Looking at it from one side, the appearance of machines implies the laws of 
nature appearing and coming into their own reality in and through man’s 
actions in the most penetrating and most apparent form. In machines, man’s 
action, we can say, has objectified itself even beyond the mode of being man’s 
action and taken on the character of being the direct operation of the laws of 
nature themselves.
Machines are pure products of human intellect. Man constructed them for 
his own purposes. They can be found nowhere in the world of nature, as the 
products of nature. In spite of this, they give expression to the operation of 
natural laws most purely—more purely than any of the products of nature 
themselves do. The laws of nature directly operate in machines with a direct­
ness indiscernible in any of the products of nature. We can say that in machines 
nature was brought back to itself in a more purified (or abstracted) form than 
is possible in nature itself.
As such, the operation of the machine has become an expression of man’s 
action. The expression of the laws of nature in a form so purely abstract that it 
is to be found in none of nature’s products and is in fact impossible as a natural 
occurence, has become in the machine an expression of man’s action.
This indicates the profundity of the rule of the laws of nature. They have 
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come to reveal the working of their rule most deeply by permeating man’s 
action and life—so deeply that nature again goes back to nature itself (brought 
to its abstract form) beyond the pale of the “human”. There is here the aspect 
of the laws of nature making the most of their rule over beings in general.
Looking at it from another side, however, the coming into being of machines 
was an epoch-making emancipation of man from the rule of the laws of nature, 
the greatest embodiment of his freedom in using the laws. In machines, man’s 
activity is wholly objectified and human artifice with certain purposes is 
inserted, so to speak, into nature as a part of natural things. In this way, man’s 
rule over nature is radicalized. This is a rule over nature more radical than 
nature rules itself.
Thus, the relation in which subordination to the rule of laws is at once 
emancipation from them here comes to light most clearly. The field of this 
relation as such finds expression in machines and appears in the form of 
machines.
II
Of utmost significance for us, however, is that there has arisen a great 
problematic ever since the afore-mentioned relation of the laws of nature and 
and “beings” reached the last stage ofits development, the stage of the appear­
ance of machines. The new problem lies in the fact that the very reversal of 
the relation is now in process, a reversal in which the ruling becomes itself the 
ruled.
In what I have said above, the fact that the laws of nature gradually intensify 
their rule over the being as the level of beingness ascends, means precisely 
that the being at the same time frees itself gradually from the rule of laws, rather 
making use of them for its own “purpose.” In this sense, we here find the rule­
relationship on both sides; the laws ruling over “beings” and the “beings” 
ruling over the laws. With the appearance of machines, the extreme point 
of this relationship was reached. But now there arises a new situation.
On the one hand, man’s activity and life itself is becoming, as a whole, 
gradually mechanized and impersonalized on the field where the machine 
came into being, the field wherein the rule of the laws of nature came to 
establish itself deeply in man’s activity and life. The field in which man found 
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himself when he had produced the machine and which has ever since come 
to the fore, intensifying its strength, was one in which two things—one of 
which is, on man’s side, abstract intellect looking after scientific rationality, 
and the other is, on the side of nature, “de-naturalized” nature, so to speak, 
which I have above described in terms of “purer than nature itself”—stood 
in correspondence to one another. But this same field is now gradually emerg­
ing as something which deprives man of his own human nature.
The relation I have above mentioned, where the rule of natural laws over 
beings give way to beings ruling over the laws, brought to a peak with the 
debut of the machine, has turned out to be a relation lying beyond the au­
thentic and natural connection between man and the world of nature; a field 
which transcends the limits of man’s human nature and of nature’s natural 
character. Herein the relation attains its most thorough radicalization. But, at 
the same time, we see here a profound reversal of such a relation now emerging 
in this limit-situation. It can be described as a relation wherein the rule of 
natural laws over man’s action and life that directly engendered man’s rule over 
the laws of nature is reversed from a more fundamental position to a relation 
in which the laws of nature once more come to rule man who hitherto has held 
sway over them. This is none other than what is called the tendency towards 
man’s mechanization, towards the loss ofhuman nature; the situation, needless 
to say, now constituting one of the basic features of the “culture crisis.”
On the other hand, there appears in this reversed relation another issue in 
connection with man’s mechanization. Just as man’s mechanization is a reversal 
of his rule over the laws of nature, a reversal likewise arises in the rule of natural 
laws over man. The rule of natural laws, pushed to the limit-situation in their 
profound internal rule over man, opens up a mode of being in which man 
behaves as if he stood entirely outside the laws of nature.
Such is, briefly speaking, man’s mode of being, at the bottom of which 
nihilum opens up. Eventually, the place where the machine comes into being— 
the field in which, as I said before, the correspondence of abstract intellect 
demanding scientific rationality with denaturalized nature obtains—opens 
up nihilum at the bottom both of man who relies on that intellect and of the 
world of nature as well.
It is now only in standing on this nihilum that man is able to find himself 
detached and completely free from the radical and thoroughgoing rule of the 
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laws of nature. This is a standpoint in which man looks at the laws of nature 
as if they were entirely external to him. Here, the mode of man’s being where­
by he lives in keeping with the natural order or natural laws, as has been 
advocated from ancient times, is completely broken through. In place of it, 
there comes into view a mode of being wherein man behaves as if he, while 
standing on the freedom of nihilum, makes use of the laws of nature entirely 
from without. This mode of being is characteristic of man as a subject that 
adapts itself to impulsive and desire-driven life; that means, in other words, 
man’s subjectivity establishing itself on the plane of life in its natural and 
raw state, of life’s own naked vitality. In this sense, it appears to show similari­
ties to “instinct.” But the fact is that it is a mode of being diametrically op­
posite to “instinct,” as a mode of being of a subject standing steadfastly on 
nihilum.
This mode of being of a subject that, grounded on nihilum, adapts itself to raw 
life, exhibits its images according to the depth or shallowness of its adaptation. 
For instance, nihilum lies hidden even behind the tendency in which the average 
person in the contemporary world passionately devotes himself to sports, 
cycling races, or other amusements. Here nihilum is only floating in the atmos­
phere of man’s life without clearly coming to his consciousness. Yet there is 
at work a masked nihilism. On the other hand, there is a nihilism which, wholly 
antagonistic to the condition of the average person in mass society, assumes 
the form of existential solitude, in which nihilum is chosen as the ground of 
one’s own being with clear consciousness and decision. Between these two, 
there are nihilisms of all shades. These various kinds of nihilism have something 
in common in a mode of being, a nakedly-living subjectivity which stands 
steadfast on nihilum. It is a mode of man’s being wherein he uses the laws of 
nature by behaving as if he stood entirely outside them. The rule of natural 
laws over man was reversed at its ultimate extremity into such a mode of man’s 
being.
That the laws of nature, while coming into their own reality through man’s 
acts rule over man, implies the rationalization of human life and thought. 
This rationalization has from the eighteenth century Age of Enlightenment 
even up to the present been conceived as man’s progress. But, in fact, from the 
ground of that rationalized life is gradually emerging a naked life entirely 
anterior to rationalization—the naked life of a man whose being is grounded 
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on nihilium which opens up in a place inaccessible to any kind of rationalization.
Behind and in parallel with the advancement of the rationalization of life, 
man’s affirmation of his own entirely ir-rational, un-spiritual—or rather entirely 
“pre-reflective”—mode of being, that is, the status of a subject that, while 
standing steadfast on nihilum, pursues its desire unrestrictedly, is increasing 
in potency. This circumstance also constitutes one of the basic aspects of 
what is usually called the contemporary culture crisis.
Thus, from whichever side one looks at it, there comes into view a reversal 
in which the ruling becomes itself the ruled. At the extremity of his freedom in 
ruling over the laws of nature, man shows a tendency to be deprived of his 
human nature and be mechanized. At the extremity of their permeating and 
totally ruling man’s life, the laws of nature come to be ruled by man who, 
as a subject of desire-driven freedom, behaves as if he stood outside all the 
laws and their controls. The mechanization of man’s life and his change into 
a completely ir-rational subject arise as a fundamental whole. As I said be­
fore, it is in the mechanical technique, in the fact that the realm in which the 
machine comes into existence is opened up within man’s life, that the situation 
in which the subordination to the laws is at once emancipation from them as­
sumes its most radical form. But at the same time, the real aspect of this situa­
tion now appears as an inverted image that hides most secretly its real form, 
the authentic relation that naturally ought to be between man and the world 
of nature even in the situation of technology shows an image in actuality of 
human life as if it were fallen into a state of perversion. This is what we usu­
ally mean by saying that man is dragged along by the machines he himself 
constructs. This is also the matter underlying the problem of imbalance be­
tween the progress of science and the progress of man’s morality. The crux 
of the matter is not so much their imbalance as their movement in contrary 
directions. It goes without saying that this problematic pointedly takes one 
shape in the problem of nuclear weapons.
Furthermore, if we extend our argument from man’s mechanization and 
his change into a desire-driven subject to historical and social problems, the 
various forms of political institutions in the contemporary world, for instance, 
will also fall under this same problematic. In the communist countries, the 
political institution exhibits a tendency towards totalitarianism which implies 
direction to the mechanization of institutions as well as of man. In the 
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liberalistic countries, the freedom of individuals in democracy is apt to change 
into that of the merely desire-driven subject. These two different directions 
are derived then from the same root and converge into the same problematic. 
Lastly, viewed as a whole, the problem of mechanical civilization and of polit­
ical institution reverts to one and the same ultimate root, which is the site 
whence the contemporary version of nihilism is emerging, either in a cam­
ouflaged form or in a form brought to consciousness of itself.
Nihilism in the present world begins, as was said before, with the sense of 
meaninglessness that has come to be perceived from the depths of both man 
himself and the world, in parallel with the appearance of the mechanistic 
world-image of modern science and in parallel with an increasing tendency 
man’s mechanization which has gradually permeated not only the social struc­
tures in the modern world but also man’s inner life.
In the midst of the tendency of human life to be in fact mechanized socially 
as well as psychologically and taken itself for a kind of mechanism, man has 
rendered himself capable of escaping from being dissolved into a mechanism, 
inner or outer, only as a desire-driven subject that places itself (with or without 
towards self-consciousness) on the nihilum that opens up at the ground of that 
mechanism.
As was noted before, the reversal which occurred between the authentic 
relation of natural laws and man has taken the shape of a basic intertwining 
of man’s mechanization and his change into a desire-driven subject. At the 
bottom of this intertwining, nihilum has opened up as a sense of the meaning­
lessness of the whole affair. This nihilum has come to reveal itself precisely as 
what ought to have emerged from the basic situation in which man finds him­
self in the contemporary world. Hence, it is something which cannot remain 
unperceived. It eventually has to come to man’s self-awareness, if he but 
fixes his sight upon his own existence without delusions of any kind.
This is why many contemporary existentialists, by virtue of honesty to their 
own existence, have decided of themselves to stand steadfastly on nihilum. 
Such a positive nihilism in existentialism reveals an intent to step outside man’s 
mechanization as well as his degeneration to a desire-driven mode of being, 
both inherent in the nihilism which is not yet brought to consciousness of itself. 
In other words, it shows an effort to avoid the pitfail of the perversion into 
which man falls victim at present.
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But at the same time, man cannot manage to escape the perversion as long 
as he places himself on nihilum, because the nihilum opened up precisely through 
that perversion, and the pitfall which opened up at the bottom of that 
perversion is none other than nihilum. Nihilum cannot escape nihilum by itself. 
Nihilism is prevented from actualizing its afore-mentioned intention through 
the very nihilum on which it stands so steadfastly. Nihilism and the conscious­
ness of nihilum therein involves such a dilemma.
Moreover, if this nihilism can be said to have arisen from the rule of natural 
laws, from the influential role played by science and technique in the manner 
in which man is concerned with the world and with himself, we can say also 
that in this nihilism and in the dilemma involved therein, the problem of 
science and religion comes into question in its most concentrated and fun­
damental form.
in
In the preceding paragraph, I spoke of the rule of science and scientific tech­
nique, or more fundamentally, of the field wherein they arise: the opening up 
of the sphere in which abstract, impersonal intellect and the mechanistic world­
image correspond with each other. I also spoke of the emergence, owing to this 
new situation, of a two-sided tendency towards the mechanization of man’s 
inner life and social relations on the one hand and man’s transformation into a 
desire-driven subject on the other: in a word, a tendency towards the loss of 
humanity. As for these problems in our contemporary world, the traditional 
religions which, in favor of the concept of God and man as personal, have based 
themselves on the personal relation between them, find themselves confronted 
with one fundamental and difficult question.
To emphasize the meaning of man’s personality or spirit is, of course, in­
dispensable for man’s right mode of being, which goes in the direction dia­
metrically opposed to the loss of humanity. This is also why ethics, art, and 
philosophy are of great significance. From the realm of these realities, it 
is even possible for us to draw a definite line of demarcation, in one way or 
another, against the domination of science.
What’s more, at the base of that personal-spiritual realm, the relation to God 
as absolute personality (or absolute spirit) was speculated and man’s per-
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sonality or spirit was thought to be firmly grounded only on this religious 
relation. The direction opposite to the rule of science has drawn, in most cases, 
its motive power from this realm of religion. Hence, resistance against a tend­
ency towards loss of humanity has, till now, assumed the form of setting limits 
to the standpoint of science from a basic religious realm. Also we can trace the 
ever recurring mark of such repeated efforts of resistance in the history of 
philosophy since Descartes. These efforts were made with good reason, because 
personality or spirit constitutes the core of genuine humanity.
As was noted before, however, due to natural science the image of the natural 
world has undergone a complete change since the Renaissance. The world has 
emerged as entirely inhuman and wholly indifferent to human affairs. It has 
severed the personal relation of God and man horizontally. As a result, the 
ordering the world through God, the divine providence in history, and even 
the existence of God have become notions alien to the human mind. Man has 
become gradually indifferent to these notions and eventually to his own human 
nature. Man’s dehumanization and mechanization is in progress.
Face to face with such a situation, we cannot help but think that there has 
appeared something that is absolutely beyond our solution, insofar as we keep 
our footing only on the idea of personality or spirit, or on the idea of the 
personal relation of God and man. Here arises the claim, as I referred to before,1 
that a trans-personal field should be opened up beyond the domain of so-called 
personality or spirit—the precise and the only field, however, in which person­
ality and spirit come into their own reality and appear in their true figure as 
personality and spirit.
1. “The Personal and the Impersonal in Religion,” The Eastern Buddhist, vol. Ill, no. I 
and no. 2.
2. “The Personal and the Impersonal in Religion,” The Eastern Buddhist, vol. Ill, no. I.
Before,21 thought it possible to recognize a “personal-impersonal” character 
in so-called God’s omnipresence, in non-differentiating divine “Love,” or 
“God’s perfection,” which causes the sun to rise equally on both the good 
and the evil. The reason thereof is that I recognize in the Christian concept of 
“God” a facet of trans-personality. Eckhart indicates the same thing when he 
speaks of absolute nothingness as the “ground” of the personal God. He con­
ceives it as the plane of absolute negativity, in which subjectivity as “per-
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sonality” is broken through directly underfoot of itself. At the same time, he 
conceives it as the plane of absolute affirmation on which our personality re­
appears and comes into its own reality; in a word, the plane of absolute death- 
sive-life.
Such a plane must not be on the yonder-side of “this world,” of “this earth­
ly life,” etc. It must not be merely “transcendent”. On the contrary, it must 
be, in truth, radically on this-side, be even more this-sided than our lives and 
ourselves here and now are ordinarily supposed to be. Eckhart’s “detachment,” 
that is to say, transcendence not only from the self and the world but also even 
from God—as he says, he flees from God for God’s sake—must be, so to speak, 
the absolutely transcendent this-side. He himself says that the ground of God 
is, within the self, more intimately near the self than the self itself.
It is in the Buddhist standpoint of sunyata (emptiness) that such a point 
comes to light more clearly. Sunyata is the place where each of us realizes him­
self in his own true reality (suchness)—himself taken as a concrete and whole 
man involving not only his personality but also his body—and is at the same 
time the place where all things around us present themselves in their own 
true reality (suchness). As we said before,3 it can also be said to be the place 
where the words, “once the Great Death, then heaven and earth become 
new,” can at once signify the resurrection of one’s self.
3. In Chapter 1 of “What is Religion?” Philosophical Studies of Japan n.
“Resurrection” here means that the original face of one’s self comes to appear 
as such; that one goes back to his authentic self as it really is.
Would it miss the mark to say that it is only when one returns to such a 
standpoint that the afore-mentioned relation—in which subordination to the 
rule of law is at once emancipation from it—can truly be established; that 
moreover, it is with the real possibility of that relation that the possibility of 
man’s existence can also truly be established? Would it be too much to say that 
only there can we find a standpoint that can truly overcome the situation 
wherein, as a result of the rule of science, that relation has undergone reversal 
and wherein the loss of humanity is in rapid progress; the standpoint which can 
truly overcome the nihilism which that reversal has caused? In the follow­




In the preceding paragraph, I argued that sunyata is the absolutely tran­
scendent plane which is opened up not on the yonder-side of us, but on the 
genuine this-side which is more this-side than we to ourselves, and that this 
opening-up means a turn-about that should be described in terms of absolute 
death-xw-life. And it belongs to the nature of this death-izp^-life that it must 
be taken up seriously and honestly, and that means, as radically as possible.
Up to the present, “to die and be reborn” has been spoken of in various 
religions. For instance, the admonition that one must die to finite life and be 
reborn to eternal life, that one must die to the world and to oneself and be 
reborn in God. In these cases emphasis is laid upon the life side. “Soul,” 
“spirit,” and “personality” have in most cases been treated from the viewpoint 
of life. (Even in the case of the dead; the soul or spirit as a ghost.) In this life 
direction, with one step beyond the level of inanimate things the level of living 
things was seen, and from there an ascending direction to the stories of soul 
and spirit (or personality) was considered, and finally on top of this, in a kind 
of leap, the field of religion was conceived of as the personal relation of God 
and man. But, on the other hand, the death direction goes back through per­
sonality, spirit, soul, and life, and eventually arrives at inanimate things. Here, 
all things are conceived as based upon and reducible to materiality. The 
scientific way of thinking is fundamentally established in this direction. And 
again, in a kind of leap, at the limit of this direction, nihilum and meaningless­
ness is opened up at the base of all things and of life itself. Consciousness of this 
nihilum and meaninglessness gives rise to nihilism, as mentioned above.
It goes without saying that such a simple diagram as just described is, in fact, 
inadequate to fully express the matter involved here. For instance, insofar as 
all things are thought, as in the case of Christianity, to have been created out 
of nihilum, the so-called personal relation of God and man occurs as the grace of 
salvation through which eternal life is granted from beyond by breaking 
through that nihilum. Since a salvation of this sort has the implication of “to 
die and be reborn,” it contains something which cannot simply be disposed 
of as belonging to the life direction.
Besides, if a man, without God and without ceasing to be a finite being,
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intends uncompromisely to be himself, nihilum or death that absolutely separates 
him from God comes to his self-consciousness as a sin that makes him revolt 
against God. Sin is, as it were, nihilum or death in a sublimated form, which 
has come in sight on the scene of self-conscious existence. The root of this 
“original sin” spreads out even into the soul or the animal life of “natural” 
man, not to speak of his spirit or personality. Hence salvation as the forgive­
ness of that sin consists in overcoming the nihilum or death in its basic, sub­
limated and comprehensive form. “To die and be reborn” can also be spoken 
of in such a more fundamental sense. The life direction, of which I spoke above, 
can open up the realm of religion only by profoundly overcoming death; as I 
said before, here there is a leap.
Conversely, when it is said that in the death direction meaninglessness and 
nihilum is opened up at the base of all things and at the base of life itself, it does 
not simply mean that God is lost sight of, so that only nihilum in the so-called 
creatio ex nihilo is left behind, or that nihilum is perceived behind the beingness 
of finite being. If so, the nihilism we are here concerned with could not be dis­
tinguished from the old, ordinary type of nihilism.
In the modern version of nihilism, however, nihilum extends, as I said before,4 
even into the place of God’s existence and thus becomes an abyss. On that 
abysmal, Godless nihilum, all life whatsoever, that is, even spiritual-personal 
life, not to speak of animal life and the soul, reveals the feature of meaningless­
ness at its base.
4. The Eastern Buddhist, vol. Ill, no. 1, pp. 6-8.
But at the same time, according to a nihilist way of thinking, man attains 
his true subjectivity and becomes truly free and independent only when he 
decides of himself to stand steadfastly on the abysmal nihilum. Nihilum is here 
conceived as the field of ecstatic transcendence of man’s self-being, i.e., the field 
wherein the human “existence” is established. The existence placing itself 
on this field, from the point at which the meaninglessness and nihilum of life 
and being is radicalized, tries to make its own responsibility to re-create their 
meaning; or, from the unreservedly passionate desire to take its ground in the 
absurdity of life, it tries to draw a force able to affirm an absurd life as it is. In 
place of the “image of God,” the image of “super-man” or the image of really 
human “man” is here set forth as an intentional objective inherent inman.
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However this may be, in nihilism as existence there is something we cannot 
describe only in terms of death direction. There is the point where nihilum 
becomes the basis of a new, real mode of being, where death becomes the basis 
of a new, different way of living. This is why I stated before that nihilism ap­
pears as a leap on top of the death direction in which the scientific point of view 
originates. No less in the life direction than in the death direction, the real situ­
ation is never pure and simple.
In spite of all this, however, I think it possible to conclude that the tra­
ditional religions have come into being, by and large, with the life direction 
as their axis, and that the line connecting the scientific viewpoint and nihil­
ism has originated with the death direction as its axis. This can be made clearer 
if compared with the standpoint of sunyata mentioned before.
As was once mentioned, we can see everything as established in its true real­
ity as the point of intersection between the direction of life and the direction of 
death. Everything can be seen as a kind of “double exposure” of life and death, 
of being and nihilum. With this, however, I do not advance a way of viewing 
things similar to that Plato inaugurated: that the things in the sensible world 
are transient beings undergoing a constant change because of their being a 
“mixture” of being and non-being. I do not also mean that being and non- 
being mingle together in something as if they were its quantitative parts, or, 
needless to say, that death arises where life comes to exhaustion, or that 
nihilum appears when being disappears. My point is, that life remains life to the 
end, and death always death, but that they together constitute a “thing” in its 
reality, bringing it to appearance as a certain thing, and that the life aspect 
and the death aspect of a thing can be superposed upon each other and things 
can be seen in both aspects at once. In this sense, such a mode of being can be 
called life-fip^-death, death-iw-life. Thus a way is possible, I think, of viewing 
things directly in their own reality which is their mode of being life-jw- 
death or death-nr^-life, therefore with no need for us to look away from the 
actual appearance of things.
Of the two directions of viewing things I spoke of before, the one tried to 
grasp the actual appearance of things with the life direction as its axis, and 
the other with the death direction as its axis. Thus there arises, on the one hand, 
an upward-moving viewpoint ascending from life and soul to spirit or per­
sonality. In the extremity of this movement the “death”, which is implied
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throughout spirit, personality, soul, and life, comes to awareness as sin (in 
Christianity, as “original sin”) in the sense of disobedience or rebellion against 
God as absolute life. And at the same time, by passing through the bottom of 
that death, as a religious conquest of death, the standpoint of a personal com­
munion with God appears as a leap.
On the other, there arises an opposite direction of reducing everything to 
material relationships. In the extremity of this movement the “life” which is 
implied throughout life, soul, personality and spirit, comes to awareness as 
meaninglessness. And in this case, as a conquest of this meaninglessness by 
passing through its bottom, the standpoint of ecstatic existence in the midst 
of nihilism appears as a leap. However, what becomes of the matter when we 
proceed to see things directly as they are in accordance with their mode of 
being life-nw-death, death-riw-life?
Possibly, a sort of leap may be even found here, yet it would not be by as­
cending along the line of development towards personality or by descending 
along the line of reduction towards materiality. Rather, it must be a leap which 
takes place in the direction of its own ground, directly underfoot that mode of 
being called life-npf-death, death-jw-life. There should arise a new viewpoint 
with a completely different perspective from the ones whereby we make 
various distinctions of stages or levels in between materiality and personality 
and hence wherein we speak of “ascending” to a higher stage or of “reducing” 
to a lower. One could conceive of a standpoint in which personality and materi­
ality, usually considered as wholly exclusive of each other, can be seen in a 
sort of “double exposure,” apart from the fixed notions attached to them. 
This could be described as the standpoint of absolute “equality” in which 
personality, while retaining its suchness, is nevertheless seen as equal to 
material things, and in which material things, without ceasing to present 
themselves as such, are nevertheless seen as equal to personality. It is precisely 
the standpoint of sunyata that makes possible the arising of such a viewpoint.
But what does this view mean? Why should it be the standpoint of sunyata? 
In order to answer these questions, it is necessary to give attention above all 
to the difference between the idea of nihilum upon which nihilism is based and 
the idea of sunyata.
(To be continued)
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